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The landlord’s hypothec: difficulties in practice 
 
 
Sarah Skea    Andrew J M Steven     
Solicitor    Lecturer in Law 
Tods Murray LLP   University of Edinburgh 
 
 
The authors argue that the reforms to the landlord’s hypothec by the Bankruptcy and 
Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007 leave several questions unanswered and call on the 
Scottish Government to remedy the uncertainties. 
 
On 1 April 2008 the landlord’s hypothec was reformed fundamentally, when section 
208 of the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Act 2007 came into force. The 
headline changes were as follows. First, the enforcement procedure of sequestration 
for rent was abolished: s 208(1). Secondly, the hypothec no longer applies to leases of 
dwellinghouses, agricultural land or crofts: s 208(3). In effect its application is 
confined to commercial leases. Thirdly, the hypothec now cannot affect property 
which does not belong to the tenant: s 208(4). Significant law reform was therefore 
effected by means of one section in one Act. Unfortunately, the result is not a 
coherent one and the more that one looks at the provisions, the more questions which 
arise.  
 
We understand that the uncertainties are causing significant difficulties for solicitors 
acting for both landlords and insolvency practitioners. This has been confirmed by the 
publication of two helpful articles focussing on the remedy in the insolvency context: 
R Roxburgh, “Landlord’s hypothec in formal insolvencies” 2009 SLT (News) 227 
and A Burrow, “Uncertain security” 2010 JLSS Jan/47. More recently, Professor 
Angus McAllister has published a compelling critique of some of the difficulties with 
the new law: see “The Landlord’s Hypothec: Down But Is It Out?” 2010 Juridical 
Review 65. In this article, we too will highlight a number of problems now affecting 
the hypothec. 
 
Enforcement: general 
Now that sequestration for rent has gone, landlords need to know how to enforce the 
security.  In practice we understand that some landlords are reluctant to do so because 
of the Taxes Management Act 1970 s 64(1), which makes them liable for certain tax 
arrears of the tenant. We return to this later. Section 208 of the 2007 Act in fact is 
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unacceptably opaque as to enforcement procedure. Subsection (2)(a) provides that the 
hypothec “continues . . . as a right in security over corporeal moveable property kept 
in or on the subjects let”. Subsection (2)(b) goes on to provide that it “ranks 
accordingly in any (i) sequestration; (ii) insolvency proceedings; or (iii) other process 
in which there is ranking, in respect of that property”. Exactly, however, is it to be 
enforced? In his article, at 2009 SLT (News) 227, Mr Roxburgh writes: “Currently 
there is no route for a landlord to enforce its hypothec rights other than through a 
formal insolvency process.” This may well be the view currently taken in practice. 
But it seems to run counter to the wording of s 208(2)(b)(iii), which refers to “other 
process in which there is ranking”. Surely this could include a competition between 
different unsecured creditors carrying out diligence, where there is no insolvency.     
 
If this is correct, what enforcement procedure can be used? In a previous article 
entitled “Goodbye to Sequestration for Rent” 2006 SLT (News) 17, one of us pointed 
out that the answer may apparently be found in para 1019 of the Policy Memorandum 
to the Bill which has now become the 2007 Act. There, the Scottish Executive (as it 
was then called) stated in relation to the abolition of sequestration for rent:  “The only 
defence [for sequestration for rent] would be that there was no alternative, but that is 
not the case as the landlord can attach any property of the debtor tenant under the 
2002 Act.” If, however, attachment is to be the landlord’s means of enforcement now, 
s 208 should make that clear. Similarly, if the intention was that it can only be 
enforced now in insolvency, that should have been stated expressly. 
 
Summary diligence 
If attachment can be used this raises a number of issues. The first relates to manner of 
enforcement. In practice commercial leases invariably contain a clause under which 
the tenant consents to registration for preservation and execution in the Books of 
Council and Session. This enables the landlord to carry out summary diligence in 
respect of rent arrears and other sums due such as service charge. Can this type of 
diligence now be used to enforce the hypothec? If so, does the landlord have to say 
that this is what is being done and thus draw a distinction between the rent and other 
debts? This may be important if another creditor tries to carry out diligence and the 
landlord wishes to claim priority. 
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Equalisation of diligences 
The second issue is whether an attachment used to enforce the hypothec is subject to 
the rules on equalisations of diligences. See the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 s 37 
and Sch 7 para 24, and the Insolvency Act 1986 s 185. The effect of these provisions 
is to remove the priority of a creditor who carries out diligence within certain periods 
of an insolvency. These did not apply to sequestration for rent, but do apply to 
attachment. What, however, is the position as regards an attachment used to enforce 
the hypothec? Arguably it is unaffected by the equalisation rules, because s 208(2), 
quoted above, provides that the hypothec ranks as a right in security. Conventional 
and tacit securities such as pledge and lien are not subject to the equalisation rules. 
Judicial security i.e. diligence generally is. Nevertheless, the position is not certain. 
Prof McAllister, for example, in his article, 2010 Juridical Review 65 at 69 takes the 
view that a landlord using attachment would have “no advantage over other creditors 
using the same method”. The lack of clarity in the law is problematic for practitioners 
trying to give advice to landlords and insolvency officials. 
 
Enforcement in insolvency 
The third issue is that in the past insolvency practitioners have not recognised the 
priority of the landlord under the hypothec unless there have been sequestration for 
rent proceedings. For example, in Cumbernauld Development Corporation v Mustone 
1983 SLT (Sh Ct) 55 a receiver was appointed to the tenant company on 15 January 
1981. On 27 February 1981 sequestration for rent was carried out. On 6 March 1981 a 
provisional liquidator was appointed, and then on 3 April 1981 the official liquidator 
took office. See similarly Grampian Regional Council v Drill Stem (Inspection 
Services) Ltd 1994 SCLR 36. 
 
What in fact was the law prior to the 2007 Act?  Mr Roxburgh refers in his article to 
W M Gloag and J M Irvine, Law of Rights in Security (1897) p 424: “A landlord, in 
virtue of his hypothec, has a real right over the invecta et illata, and is thereby 
preferable to the diligence of ordinary creditors, even without the use of sequestration. 
Thus he is entitled to stop a poinding, unless sufficient goods are left to satisfy his 
claim, or caution is found for the rent.” He continues “That would indicate that a 
landlord is entitled to a hypothec even without commencing any form of court action 
to establish it.” We would agree that the landlord is “entitled” to the hypothec. 
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However, being able to stop a poinding (in effect restraining other creditors) is not 
necessarily the same as directly enforcing the security. In fact, Gloag and Irvine go on 
to say:   “And it is expressly provided in the Bankruptcy Act 1856 that nothing in the 
Act shall affect the landlord's hypothec; and therefore the sequestration of the tenant 
leaves the right of the landlord unaffected, and he may make good his right by 
sequestration under his hypothec in a question with the trustee”. They cite Earl of 
Wemyss v Hewat (1818) Hume 233, where a trustee in sequestration’s attempt to stop 
a sequestration for rent failed. The provision in the 1856 Act is now s 33(2) of the 
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985: “The vesting of a debtor’s estate in a trustee shall 
not affect the right of hypothec of a landlord”. Thus it appears that sequestration for 
rent was therefore still needed in a question with a trustee, because it was the way in 
which the hypothec was enforced. And, more generally, Gloag and Irvine write at p 
430: “The general security afforded by the hypothec is converted into an attachment 
of specific subjects by the use of sequestration [for rent].” 
 
Does attachment have to be carried out before the landlord’s security is recognised in 
practice under the new law? There is no explicit requirement under s 208(2), which 
we quoted above. It simply provides that the hypothec “continues . . .  as a right in 
security” and “ranks accordingly in any - (i) sequestration . . .” It is difficult to argue 
that attachment is a pre-requisite of a claim given the word “continues” because it was 
not required before 1 April 2008. Rather, sequestration for rent was needed. It may 
therefore well be the case that the landlord is entitled to be preferred merely by 
making a relevant claim to the insolvency official. This is also the view taken by both 
Mr Roxburgh and Mr Burrow in their articles, but it is another defect of s 208 that it 
does not make the position absolutely clear.  
 
Landlord’s liability for tax  
A fourth issue leads on from the third. It concerns the Taxes Management Act 1970 s 
64(1) (mentioned above). This provision has been amended by the 2007 Act Sch 6 
Part 1 and earlier statutes. It now provides: “If at any time at which moveable goods 
and effects belonging to any person (in this section referred to as “the person in 
default”) are liable to be taken by virtue of any diligence whatever, or by assignation 
the person in default is in arrears in respect of any such sums as are referred to in 
subsection (1A) below, the goods and effects may not be taken unless on demand 
5 
made by the collector the person proceeding to take the goods and effects pays the 
such sums as have fallen due at or before the date of poinding or, as the case may be, 
other diligence or assignation.” Subsection (1A) sets out the relevant tax claims. The 
reference to “poinding” has been missed by the 2007 Act and indeed the Debt 
Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002 which replaced poindings with 
attachments. It should have been repealed. An earlier reference to this obsolete 
diligence along with one to sequestration for rent is duly repealed by Sch 6 Part 1. 
The important question, however, is whether s 64 applies if the tenant has become 
insolvent and the landlord simply intimates his or her right of hypothec to the 
insolvency official. The provision is predicated on there being a poinding or other 
diligence or assignation. In this situation there is no such process and therefore the 
provision does not appear to apply. This is the view taken by Mr Roxburgh, with 
which we agree. But it does take us back to the earlier question of the law requiring to 
be clarified in relation to enforcement. 
 
The duty to plenish 
It is well established at common law that in leases where the landlord’s hypothec 
applies the tenant is under a duty to plenish the premises with goods against which the 
security can be enforced if necessary. If this obligation is not fulfilled then the 
landlord can seek a plenishing order. Gloag and Irvine at p 428 write: “Such an order 
ordains the tenant to plenish the subjects, so as to afford security sufficient in value fir 
the rent . . . It should be granted only for the rent covered by the hypothec, not for 
arrears of rent.” At common law, the hypothec had fairly restrictive time limits in this 
regard. Again in the words of Gloag and Irvine, this time at p 417, it gives “a right in 
security for each year’s rent as it falls due, provided that the goods have been actually 
on the premises during that year. It gives no security for arrears; and in order to make 
his right effectual, the landlord must enforce his hypothec by sequestration within 
three months after the term at which the rent is payable.” Exceptionally, sequestration 
in security for rent not yet due was permitted.  
 
Section 208(8) replaces the common law rule by providing that the hypothec “(a) is 
security for rent due and unpaid only; and (b) subsists for so long as that rent remains 
unpaid.” The hypothec thus in principle covers far more rent, presumably up to five 
years arrears, at which point the short negative prescription will operate if there has 
6 
been no relevant claim. In practice no commercial landlord would let arrears build up 
that long. Nevertheless, what exactly is the effect of s 208(8) on the duty to plenish? 
Can the landlord now call on the tenant to plenish beyond the value of a year’s rent? 
The position is simply unclear and should be clarified. For further discussion, see 
McAllister, 2010 Juridical Review 65 at 69-73.      
 
Conclusion 
The changes made to the landlord’s hypothec unfortunately are not an example of 
good law reform. Too many uncertainties remain. The position may be contrasted 
with England. There the equivalent common law remedy of distress is to be replaced 
by a new procedure called Commercial Rent Arrears Recovery (CRAR). This will be 
regulated by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 ss 72-87 and Sch 12 
and it is understood from the Ministry of Justice that the provisions will be brought 
into force in April 2012. We hope in the meantime that the Scottish Government will 
consider the difficulties arising out of s 208 of the Bankruptcy and Diligence etc 
(Scotland) Act 2007 and introduce appropriate amending legislation which clarifies 
the operation of the landlord’s hypothec.  
   
   
(We are very grateful to Donna McKenzie Skene of the University of Aberdeen and 
Kirsty Slee of Anderson Strathern for their comments and suggestions). 
 
